

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRANCE RANSOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOUSTON COUNTY, *et al.*,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-943-RAH
[WO]

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed this *pro se* U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging conditions at the Houston County Jail. On December 6, 2019, the court entered an order requiring Plaintiff to submit an appropriate affidavit in support of a motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* or pay the requisite filing and administrative fees. Doc. 3. On December 17, 2019, the court entered a notice of case reassignment. Doc. 4. The Clerk mailed a copy of both orders to Plaintiff at the last service address on record.¹

On December 30, 2019, Plaintiff's copy of the December 17, 2019, notice was returned to the court marked as undeliverable because Plaintiff is no longer housed at the last service address the court has on file for him. Accordingly, the court entered an order on February 10, 2020, requiring that by February 20, 2020, Plaintiff file with the court a current address or show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to adequately prosecute this action. Doc. 5. This order specifically advised Plaintiff this case could not proceed if his whereabouts remained unknown and cautioned him that his failure to comply with its directives would result in the dismissal of this case. *Id.* The court has received no response from Plaintiff to the February 10,

¹The last address provided by Plaintiff is the Houston County Jail.

2020, order nor has he provided the court with his current address. The court therefore concludes this case should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a measure less drastic than dismissal is appropriate. *See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia*, 248 F. App'x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. First, the administration of this case cannot properly proceed in Plaintiff's absence. Next, it appears Plaintiff is no longer interested in the prosecution of this case as he has failed to provide this court with a current service address. Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that any additional effort by this court to secure Plaintiff's compliance would be unavailing and a waste of this court's scarce judicial resources. Consequently, the undersigned concludes that this case is due to be dismissed. *See Moon v. Newsome*, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion.). The authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts "to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." *Id.* at 630–31; *Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla.*, 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that a "district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket."). "The sanctions imposed [upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the action with or without prejudice." *Id.*

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute this action. It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or before **March 12, 2020**. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in

the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. This Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. *See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). *See also Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE this 27th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.
WALLACE CAPEL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE